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The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in ERISA Section
502 (a) (1) (B) Actions: Wardle v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund
A teamsters union pension fund (the Fund) denied Claude
Wardle's application for retirement benefits because Wardle allegedly lacked the requisite years as an employee in the industry.' Wardle sought review of the Fund's decision in federal
district court under section 502(a) (1) (B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)2 and demanded a jury
trial of the issues. 3 The district court refused to provide a jury
trial and subsequently upheld the Fund's decision to deny pension benefits to Wardle. 4 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions of the trial court, 5
reasoning that Congress did not intend to provide jury trials in
actions under section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA, and that because
such actions present only equitable issues they do not fall
within the jury trial guarantee of the seventh amendment.
Wardle v. CentralStates, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 922
(1981).
The right to a jury trial in statutory actions may derive
from two sources. First, Congress may provide either explicitly
or implicitly for a jury trial.6 Second, regardless of congres1. During the periods in question, Wardle was an independent trucker
who worked for two different companies. He contended that the years at issue
should not be regarded as periods of self-employment but should be considered
as "continuous service in the industry." Wardle v. Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 822 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S.Ct. 922 (1981).
2. ERISA § 502(a) (1) (B) entitles a participant or beneficiary to bring a
civil action to "recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his right to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976).
3. 627 F.2d at 823. Wardle's complaint requested compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees and costs. Id.
4. Id.
5. Under a limited standard of review, the court held that the district
court's determination that Wardle was self-employed was not arbitrary, capricious, or erroneous as a matter of law. Id. at 827.
6. See, e.g., Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (express grant of a jury trial);
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976) (implicit grant of a jury
trial). See generally C. WRiGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (3d ed. 1976).
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sional intent, the seventh amendment guarantees the right to a
jury trial if the statute creates rights and remedies that would
constitute a suit "at common law."7 It is not clear whether ei-

ther of these sources creates a right to a jury trial in actions
based upon ERISA section 502(a) (1) (B); the Wardle court is
the first circuit court opinion to address that question. 8 In holding against the right to a jury trial, the Wardle decision conflicts with the decision primarily relied upon by proponents of
ERISA jury trials, a trial court ruling in Stamps v. Michigan
Teamsters Joint Council No. 43.9 The Stamps court held, on
statutory grounds, that there is a right to a jury trial in actions
based upon ERISA section 502(a) (1) (B).1o The statutory analysis in Wardle is more convincing than that in Stamps, but
both opinions failed to examine adequately the seventh amendment considerations involved. Although a more thorough constitutional analysis leads to the same result as that reached by
the Wardle court, the court's failure to conduct a careful seventh amendment inquiry is significant. As statutory actions increasingly displace the common law, they will also displace the
right to civil jury trial unless seventh amendment concerns are
fully addressed.
In adopting ERISA, Congress did not expressly indicate
whether it intended to create a right to jury trial in suits
brought under section 502 of the Act. When faced with such situations, courts often examine whether Congress intended to
provide equitable or legal relief, employing this traditional distinction to infer whether Congress intended to provide a right
to a jury trial." This approach to statutory construction is
somewhat complicated, however, in the context of ERISA section 502(a). The cause of action in both Wardle and Stamps
was based on subsection (1) (B) of section 502(a). That subsec7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIL For example, in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974), plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages for a discriminatory refusal
to lease an apartment in violation of Title VII. The Court held that because this
was "an action to enforce 'legal rights' within the meaning of our Seventh
Amendment decisions," it required a right to a jury trial regardless of possible
legislative intent arguments to the contrary. Id. at 195. See also James, Right
to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1963).
8. See, e.g., Rice v. Hutton, 487 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (eighth circuit has yet to determine whether ERISA beneficiary actions give jury trial
right). See also Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980) (following the
Wardle court's reasoning in denying jury trial under ERISA § 502).
9. 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
10. Id. at 747. See text accompanying notes 14-15, 19-22 infra.
11. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1965) (Congress'
use of "equitable restraint" language demonstrated intent not to provide jury
trial in section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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tion entitles pension claimants to "recover benefits," "enforce
rights" and "clarify rights to future benefits,"12 but is silent as
to whether such claims are legal or equitable. Subsection (3)
of the same provision, however, provides for additional relief
and clearly labels such relief as "equitable." 3 The Stamps
court concluded that subsections (1) (B) and (3) must present
alternative legal and equitable relief to beneficiaries, reasoning
that if both gave only equitable relief, subsection (1) (B) would
be surplusage.' 4 Having thus concluded that the difference between subsections (1) (B) and (3) reflected an intent to provide
"legal" relief under subsection (1) (B), the Stamps court ruled
that Congress intended to provide the right to a jury trial.'5
The Wardle court properly rejected this surplusage argument by noting that the two subsections differ jurisdictionally,
and thus found that construing both to involve equitable relief
would not render either section superfluous.16 The Seventh
Circuit's approach becomes even more persuasive when it is
noted that the two subsections involve rights derived from
wholly different sources. Subsection (3) provides exclusive federal jurisdiction over actions involving a breach of fiduciary responsibility and over actions to enforce benefits provided under
Title I of ERISA.17 Subsection (1) (B) provides for concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction over benefit actions "which do not
involve application of the Title I provisions."18 Considering
these purposeful differences between the two subsections,
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (1976), quoted in note 2 supra.
13. ERISA § 502(a) (3) specifies that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
may bring a civil action "(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a) (3)
(1976) (emphasis added).
14. 431 F. Supp. at 747.

15. Id.
16. 687 F.2d at 828-29. ERISA § 502(e) (1) reads:
Except for actions under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary. State courts of competent jurisdiction
and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1) (1976). The subsections would not be superfluous since
"[t]he specific types of claims enumerated in § 502(a) (1) (B) would still have to
be separated in some manner from general equitable actions under § 502(a) (3)
because Congress granted state courts concurrent jurisdiction only over
§ 502(a) (1) (B) claims." 627 F.2d at 829.
17. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 [hereinafter cited
as REP. No. 1280], reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5107.
18. Id.
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there is little reason to conclude that the implicit intent of Congress was to provide legal relief and a jury trial for one action
but equitable, non-jury relief for the other.
A second argument suggesting that Congress intended to
provide a right to jury trial is based upon the legislative history
of ERISA. The conference committee report indicates that actions under ERISA section 502 are to be "regarded as arising
under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those
brought under [section] 301" of the Taft-Hartley Act. 19 The
Stamps court interpreted this language to mean that a court
should follow the substantive and procedural federal case law
formulated under section 301 whenever it might apply to ERISA questions. 20 Because some actions under Taft-Hartley section 301 have been held to include the right to a jury trial,21 the
Stamps court concluded that Congress must have intended
22
that ERISA claimants be afforded similar rights.
Some overlap between ERISA and the Taft-Hartley Act
does occur because section 302 of the latter provides guidelines
for "the establishment and operation of pension funds administered jointly by an employer and a union."23 The legislative
19. Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. Supp. at 747.
The joint explanatory statement of the conference committee reads: "All [ERISA § 502] actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under
the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 [Taft-Hartley Act]." REP.
No. 1280, supra note 17, at 327, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5038, 5107. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act gives federal courts jurisdiction
over "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... or between any such labor organizations" and allows such organizations to "sue or be sued as an entity." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)-(b) (1976).
20. 431 F. Supp. at 747; see REP. No. 1280, supra note 17, at 327, reprintedin
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5107.
21. The Stamps court cites Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corp., 380 F. Supp. 139
(E.D. Pa. 1974), for the proposition that section 301 beneficiaries have the right
to a jury trial. The Lucas case, however, involved an employee suing his union
for not fairly representing him and suing his employer for wrongful discharge.
Id. at 146. Such a suit is readily distinguishable from the beneficiary-trustee
suits under ERISA. Moreover, no court has yet provided a jury trial right in
Taft-Hartley pension-related cases. On the other hand, numerous cases involving pension claims under the Taft-Hartley Act, while not directly addressing
the jury trial question, have been tried without a jury. See, e.g., Knauss v.
Gorman, 583 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1978); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of
Illumination Prods. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826
(1976); Haynes v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 331, 332 (D.D.C. 1969); Bolgar v. Lewis, 238
F. Supp. 595, 596 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
22. 431 F. Supp. at 747.
23. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4642. Pension guidelines are provided under Taft-Hartley to exempt joint pension funds from a general prohibition against employer
payments to labor organizations. Allowing such payments is thought to pro-
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history of ERISA section 502, however, makes reference only to
section 301 of Taft-Hartley, 24 the jurisdictional basis for the
substantive rules of section 302, but not to section 302 itself.
The Wardle court interpreted this cross reference to mean that
Congress intended courts to develop a separate federal common law under ERISA, in a "similar fashion" to the development under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.25 This
approach will not require all of the procedural and substantive
rules under the Taft-Hartley Act to be transferred to ERISA.
Instead, ERISA actions would be treated as presenting issues
26
for development of a separate federal common law.
The Wardle court's interpretation seems more plausible
when the differences between Taft-Hartley and ERISA are considered. The range of possible actions under Taft-Hartley is
quite broad and includes alleged breaches of collective bargaining agreements which are clearly legal contract claims that are
triable to a jury.27 In contrast, ERISA section 502 focuses more
narrowly on claims for pension benefits and mentions only "equitable" rights when it characterizes such rights at all. 2 8 Given
these substantial differences, there is little reason to believe
that Congress intended to incorporate the entire body of TaftHartley case law in ERISA actions or that it sought to incorporate only the right to a jury trial when it could have done so
more directly.
Thus, both statutory interpretation arguments relied upon
by the Stamps court fail to demonstrate an intent by Congress
to create the right to a jury trial in actions under ERISA secduce a risk of collusion between employers and unions to the detriment of employees. See Note, ERISA 's Title IV and the Multiemployer Pension Plan,1979
DuKE L. 644, 646.
24. See note 19 supra.
25. 627 F.2d at 829. Accord, Cowan v. Keystone Employee Profit Sharing
Fund, 586 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1978). See note 26 infra. See also Reiherzer v.
Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1271 (7th Cir. 1978).
26. As the Wardle court noted, the House report indicates that courts are
to rule on ERISA questions 'Just as the Supreme Court in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills . . .ruled that the courts could establish federal common law for claims 'arising under' § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act." Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
627 F.2d at 829. Lincoln Mills involved an extension of Article 111 "arising
under" power to permit development of a federal common law respecting federal statutes. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
27. See, e.g., Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 510 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1975) (contesting the binding effect of an accountant's decision under a collective bargaining agreement); Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,
494 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (suit against employers for failing to pay in
benefits to the fund).
28. See notes 2-7 supra and accompanying text.
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tion 502. The Wardle interpretation is far more convincing. Absent any affirmative evidence of an intent to create the jury
29
trial right, no such right should be judicially provided.
Regardless of congressional intent, if a statutory cause of
action creates rights and remedies found at "common law," the
seventh amendment guarantees a jury trial for that cause of action.30 The test for whether the seventh amendment applies to
a particular statute, however, is somewhat in flux. The traditional approach to the seventh amendment employed a static
historical test: only those claims that were historically legal
rather than equitable would be guaranteed the right to a jury
trial.31 Application of this historical test was relaxed-and the
right to civil jury trial arguably expanded-by a number of
Supreme Court cases addressing the implications of modern
proeedural reforms. 3 2 Recognizing that equitable relief is available only when legal relief would be "inadequate," the Supreme Court acknowledged that modem procedural reforms
have made legal relief more often "adequate," 33 and thus that
previously equitable actions could be tried to a jury.34 The
29. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (noting that Congress
may affirmatively imply a right to a jury trial, not that such a right is presumed
absent intent to the contrary). See also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACnTCE & PROCEDURE § 2314 (1971).
30. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, at 194 (1974). As a commentator on Curtis has observed: "The relevant inquiry is whether the statutory action involves rights and remedies of the sort recognized at common law, even if the
particular action was then unknown." Note, The Seventh Amendment-A Return to Fundamentals,10 URBAN L. ANN. 313, 318 (1975).
31. C. WGiGr, supra note 6, at § 92. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (holding that "common law" means "suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those in
which equitable rights alone were recognized."). But see Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MmNN. I REv. 639, 736 (1973) (arguing that the intent of the amendment was not to maintain a static historical
test but rather to employ a dynamic distinction that would respond to changing
social pressures). Under traditional analysis, courts use the standard of the
common law practice in England in 1791, the date when the amendment was
adopted. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 92.
32. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (jury trial right found for
legal issues in shareholder derivative suit, a previously equitable action); Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (defendant entitled to jury trial because plaintiff sought legal along with equitable relief); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1958) (finding right to jury trial in case involving both
legal and equitable elements with a common factual issue). See also Note, The
Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HAlv. L. REV. 898 (1979)
(suggesting that these decisions reflect trend of contemporary seventh amendment jurisprudence "away from fixed historical classifications of claims toward
categories adjusted to reflect modern procedure").
33. Examples of procedural reforms include the liberal joinder rules under
FED. R. Crv. P. 18, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
34. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
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Supreme Court last pronounced this "adequacy of the remedy"
approach in 1970 in Ross v. Bernhard,35 when it noted that the
seventh amendment inquiry should focus upon the "nature of
the issues to be tried rather than the character of the overall
action." 36 In Ross, for example, the Court deemed the underlying issues in a shareholder derivative suit legal and held that
the action as a whole was triable to a jury, even though such
37
actions had previously been considered equitable.
The potentially sweeping effect of this approach was limited, however, by a footnote in the Ross opinion which suggested that whether the underlying issue in a case is legal or
equitable depends upon (1) the pre-merger custom; (2) the
remedy sought; and (3) the practical limitations and abilities of
juries. 38 The first two criteria imply a continuing emphasis on
the traditional factors-the historical nature of the action and
the type of remedy sought.39 When these two factors point toward the same conclusion, the third criterion-the practical
limitations and abilities of juries-might not be reached at all.4O
Since Ross, the Supreme Court has been silent regarding use
of the three part test,41 and although lower courts have split in
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1959). See also Comment, Ross v. Bernhard The
UncertainFuture of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE LJ. 112, 121 (1971) (contending that the Ross "adequacy of the remedy" approach could expand jury
trial rights to all formerly equitable actions except those within the exclusive
jurisdiction of equity). The dissenters in Ross also argued that the majority's
opinion extended, rather than preserved, the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial. 396 U.S. at 543 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Redish, Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationalityof Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486, 489 (1975) (arguing that because jury trial is
inefficient, courts should employ a strictly historical test that restricts the use
of jury trials).
35. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
36. Id. at 538.
37. Id. at 542. Ross involved a shareholder derivative action in which the
plaintiff sought money damages for an alleged breach of contract and gross
negligence-claims traditionally considered legal. Id.
38. Id. at 538 n.10. See Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under the Age Discriminationin Employment and FairLabor Standards Act., 44 U. C-m I. REV.
365, 369 (1977) (arguing that the three-part test retracts from the expansive "adequacy of the remedy" approach, returning to the historical limitations). See
also Comment, supra note 34, at 126.
39. See Note, supra note 38, at 369-70.
40. See Note, supra note 38, at 369. But see Note, The Right to Trial by Jury
in Complex Litigation, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1978) (emphasizing the failure of the Court to indicate the weight to be given to each of the three factors).
Professor Wolfram argues that, if the third criterion is used apart from the
other criteria, federal judges would have a "disturbingly broad discretion" to
both expand and contract jury trial rights. Wolfram, supra note 31, at 644.
41. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974). One court has argued that the Supreme Court's lack of refer-
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their use of the test,42 the majority of lower courts have employed it as an analytical tool to examine whether the nature of
the issues in a case warrant a jury trial.43
Neither the Wardle court nor the Stamps court employed
all three of these criteria in deciding whether there is a right to
a jury trial under ERISA section 502(a) (1) (B). Instead, both
courts relied primarily upon a static historical test, albeit with
conflicting results. The historical analysis of both courts, however, can be treated as an application of the first Ross crite44
The Wardle
rion-consideration of the pre-merger custom.
court analogized an ERISA suit to the historically equitable
beneficiary-trustee action, 45 while the Stamps court considered
an ERISA action to be more like a suit for breach of a thirdparty beneficiary contract which was recognizable at common
46
law and as such, triable to a jury.
Because an ERISA action is a pension beneficiary claim
ence in these cases to the Ross footnote illustrates the test's invalidity, but the
same court also concedes that the opposite inference could be drawn: the
Supreme Court would not "overturn so significant a decision without some
comment." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 478 F. Supp. 889, 928
& n.64 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Note, supra note 40, at 348
(concluding that, although it is questionable whether the Ross test is constitutionally mandated, it should be used in deciding jury trial questions).
42. At one extreme some courts have imbued the criteria with constitutional stature. See, e.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104
(W.D. Wash. 1976). The most vigorous objection to the Ross criteria has come
from courts that view the third element as a potential "complex cases" exception to the seventh amendment. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation,
609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414,
428-29 (2d Cir. 1974).
43. See, e.g., Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 142-43 (5th Cir.
1979); Hildebrand v. Trustees of Michigan State Univ., 607 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir.
1979); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1975); Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200, 1218 (3d Cir.
1975); Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 499, 503-04 (D. Del. 1977).
44. It is not clear, however, whether "pre-merger custom" refers to the
traditional 1791 standard or whether it requires resort to the jumble of state
and federal decisions between 1791 and 1935. See Wolfram, supra note 31, at
643-44. See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 454 (little support that the Ross
criteria are being used to reject traditional historical practices).
45. 627 F.2d at 829.
46. 431 F. Supp. at 746. Jury trial proponents could argue that "because
Curtis and Pernell [see note 41 supraI did not limit the right to jury trial to
exact copies of the 1791 forms of actions" but enabled courts to analogize new
actions to other actions at common law, the third-party beneficiary analogy
seems to hold at least as much vitality as the beneficiary-trustee analogy.
Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize Seventh
Amendment Right, 58 TEX. L. REV. 549, 561 (1980) (discussing Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)).
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against the trustees of a pension fund, it does appear more
closely analogous to the old beneficiary-trustee form of action;47
thus the first Ross criterion supports denial of the right to a
jury trial. Rigid historical analysis, however, has been widely
criticized by commentators4s and even the Ross approach
treats this factor as just one of the elements for consideration.
The second Ross criterion-the type of remedy soughtseems a better measure of whether an action should be
deemed legal or equitable. 49 Indeed, the Stamps court reasoned that the remedy sought-money damages-reinforced its
analogy to a contract action.5 0 Although the Wardle court ignored the question of remedy, careful analysis indicates that
the Stamps court misapplied this factor. First, not all money
damage claims are considered "legal."5 ' For example, actions
against a trustee for breach of trust, as in Wardle, "are a classic
example of the power of an equity judge to require a defendant
to pay money."5 2 In addition, an inflexible rule that all claims
for money damages are "legal" would ignore the distinction between those rights recognized only in equity, and those demands heard in equity only because of the inadequacy of the
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959), quoted in Sichko v.
Lewis, 191 F. Supp. 68, 69 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
48. See, e.g., Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy Queen to Ross:
The Seventh Amendmen the Federal Rules, and a Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. URB.L. 459, 471 (1971) ("[T]he explicit reference in the Seventh
Amendment to a bifurcated system of justice as a point of definition for the
scope of the jury trial is difficult to insert meaningfully in a merged jurisdiction,
where many of the lines of definition are blurred.").
49. Professor McCoid suggests that "[t]he law-equity distinction is a useful basis for a principle distinct from the historical result test, only insofar as it
provides an effective means of continuing characterization." McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1967). He then argues that the Supreme
Court in Beacon Theatres met the problem "by suggesting that whether an issue is legal or equitable is determined by the nature of the relief to which it is
material." Id. at 11-12. The second Ross criterion-the nature of the remedy
sought--encompasses such an analysis and perhaps becomes a more useful criterion than the "pre-merger custom."
50. See 431 F. Supp. at 746. See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195
(1974) (money damage claim generally indicates "legal relief").
51. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); Grayson v. Wickes Corp.,
607 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1979), Kirst, supra note 46, at 571. Persons claiming
backpay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act have been denied the right to a
jury trial. See Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 499, 503 (D. DeL
1977). See also Note, supra note 38, at 365.
52. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978)
(emphasis added). See also Note, Right to Jury Trial Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 Mo. L. REV. 250, 251 (1978).
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legal remedy.5 3 Most importantly, a claim for pension benefits,
even if drafted as a claim for money damages, actually seeks
both an order (in the nature of restitution of funds paid into
the Fund)54 and, in effect, an affirmative injunction compelling
future payment of benefits (presumably calculated over life expectancy and reduced to their present value).55 Because both
of these underlying remedies are clearly equitable,56 ERISA actions, characterized in terms of "the remedy sought," must also
be equitable.
The third and more dubious criterion of the Ross test introduces the functional approach to seventh amendment analysis in examining the practical limitations and abilities of
juries.57 The Wardle court touched on the practical limitations
53. In his study of the effects of Beacon Theatres, Professor McCoid argues

that:
[Wlhether an issue is legal or equitable is determined by the nature of
the relief to which it is material Damages are legal; injunctions are equitable.... Substantive factors other than remedy were sometimes
controlling. The trust, for example, was a creature of equity. Hence, an
action by the beneficiary against the trustee, even for money, normally
was consigned to equity jurisdiction.
McCoid, supra note 49, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted). Because the Ross Court
stressed that jury trials should extend to actions that have been saved from inadequate legal remedies by procedural reforms, actions that were tried in equity regardless of the adequacy of the remedy should be unaffected by the Ross
requirements. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970).
54. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.) (backpay
award is equitable in nature, not punitive, since it restores recipients to their
rightful economic status), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
55. Cf. Baeten v. Van Ess, 474 F. Supp. 1234, 1231, (E.D. Wis. 1979) (beneficiary awarded "full interest" in pension plan).
56. See G. KEETON & L, SHEREDAN, EQurrY 459 (1969); RESTATMENT OF RESTrrIUIoN § 4 (1937).
57. This functional approach has created an extensive legal controversy in
relation to jury trials in complex cases. See, e.g., Arnold, HistoricalInquiry into
the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829,
848 (1980) (no historical right to trial in equity because of the complexity of the
issues); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of
the Seventh Amendment, 80 CoLun. L. REv. 43, 62 (1980) (chancellor historically
could take suit into equity because of complexity of the case). See generally
Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 99 (1979). Although earlier cases permitted a complexity exception, see In
re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976), a recent court of appeals decision rejects use of 'the practical limitations and abilities of juries" standard to deny a jury trial of legal issues in a complex case. In
re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 929 (1980).
The third criterion, however, may not be determinative when the two other
factors provide a clear characterization of an action as legal or equitable. See
Note, supra note 38, at 369. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 369
n.34 (1974) (Court looked solely to the historical practice of eviction actions);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (Court looked only to the nature of
the rights and remedies involved in a statutory action).
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of juries, arguing that actions, like ERISA actions, involving a
limited standard of review of another's discretionary power
"have been and should be" tried by a judge and not by a jury.58
Similarly, the Wardle court's emphasis of the historical roots of
this review standard implies some considerations of jury limitations-the limited view of jury capabilities included in those
historical roots is arguably the foundation of much equity jurisdiction. 59 Such reasoning is highly questionable, however, in
light of the prevailing belief that numerous factors other than
jury capability formed the actual rationale for placing most actions in equity. 60
Apart from this historical argument, two other considerations bearing on jury capability might be raised-the possible
complexity of ERISA actions 6l and possible jury bias. 62
Neither consideration, however, is persuasive. Although the
complexity concern has been raised in large-scale technical or
antitrust litigation, 63 a single beneficiary's suit to determine his
or her eligibiltiy for pension benefits hardly presents the same
complexity problem. 64 Similarly, although there may be legitimate concern for juror prejudice in an action pitting a large
pension fund against an individual retiree, the potential for
prejudice is no greater than that in the multitude of actions
that presently are jury-tried.65
Thus, consideration of the practical limitations and abilities
58. 627 F.2d at 830.
59. See Devlin, supra note 57, at 107 (chancellor had the power to stop a
suit at common law if "practical abilities" of juries were "not up to the complexities of the case"); Note, supra note 38, at 370 n.34.
60. See Comment, supra note 34, at 130 (suggesting that the law-equity division was less a judgment as to the limitations of juries, but rather was
"largely a product of the power struggle between the equity chancellor and the
common law courts.") See also Arnold, supra note 57, at 838-39 (arguing that
suits for accounting were tried in equity because of the equity court's unique
discovery and subpeona powers, rather than the unsuitability of the jury).
61. See note 57 supra.
62. See Redish, supra note 34, at 502-04. The Supreme Court has also recognized possible problems of juror prejudice in jury-tried Title VIII actions.
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974).
63. See, e.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D.
Wash. 1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889,
926 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). See also note 57 supra.
64. "Neither issue, entitlement, or the amount of damages, is of such complexity as to be beyond the capabilities of a jury, so the third aspect of the test
has no significant bearing upon the question presented [in an ERISA beneficiary suit]." Davis v. Huge, 91 LR.R.M. 2234, 2236 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 1975).
65. For example, products liability actions typically pit an individual plaintiff against a large manufacturer. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d
950 (3d Cir. 1980).
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of juries is at best inconclusive as a factor in deciding whether
ERISA actions should come within the seventh amendment.
Thorough analysis of the first two Ross criteria, however,
clearly demonstrates the equitable nature of the ERISA action.66 Tracing an ERISA action through the Ross criteria confirms that it is equitable in substance and not in the category of
formerly equitable actions that have been "saved" from inadequate legal remedies by changes in modern procedure. The
ERISA action therefore falls outside the modern scope of the
seventh amendment.
The Wardle court's decision to deny a jury trial reaches the
correct result on constitutional grounds and offers the better
reasoned statutory interpretation. Wardle rather than Stamps
should be followed by other courts in ruling on demands for a
jury trial in actions under ERISA section 502.67 Nonetheless,
the Wardle court's failure to address adequately seventh
amendment concerns cannot be taken lightly. Statutory causes
of action are increasingly displacing common law actions and if
the seventh amendment is to be faithfully honored, its guarantee of the right to a jury trial must be fully considered in every
statutorily created cause of action.

66. Because the pre-merger custom and remedy criteria demonstrate the
equitable nature of ERISA actions, denial of a jury trial based partly on perceived limitations of juries would not present the same problem as when an
otherwise legal issue is denied a jury trial because of the limitations of the jury.
See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889,
926 (ED. Pa. 1979), vacated ub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
67. The Fifth Circuit subsequently followed the Wardle court's lead in denying a right to trial by jury under ERISA § 502, but unfortunately also failed to
address adequately the seventh amendment question. Calamia v. Spivey, 632
F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980).

